Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, James Van Cleve and G.E.M. Anscombe

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23 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8840 There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8841 Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7439 The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
8353 Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
8352 To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20041 Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
8070 It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
8065 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe]
8069 Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8351 With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
4777 The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10363 Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8350 Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]